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1.  Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of 
Scottish policy for the provision of ferry services 1999-2009, 
a period broadly coinciding with the life of the re-established 
Scottish parliament.  We shall argue that, despite clear and 
consistent warnings by this author and others, the 
government failed to put in place measures and safeguards 
that were regarded as standard practice for such an industry 
providing essential services.  These failures in economic 
regulation in the first Session of Parliament (1999-2003) in 
turn had knock-on implications for potential breaches of EC 
State aid and competition law. The second (2003-2007 and 
third (2007-continuing) Sessions added further new problems 
in terms of potential compliance with EC State aid and 
competition law. We suggest reasons for the emergence and 
persistence of these problems and also identify possible 
solutions.     
 
Most ferry operations in Scotland are provided by two State-
owned companies, CalMac Ferries and NorthLink. CalMac 
Ferries recently won a six year contract to provide Clyde and 
Hebrides ferry services.  The contract to provide the Northern 
Isles (Orkney and Shetland to Mainland services) was the 
subject of re-tendering in 2006. In 2008, the Scottish 
Government initiated a pilot study to test a Road Equivalent 
Tariff (RET) fares system for Scotland’s ferry services.  Then 
in May 2008, the European Commission announced
1
 it was 
to investigate payments of subsidies to CalMac and Northlink  
 
As far as the current policy is concerned, the Scottish 
Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) recently produced a 
briefing paper on ferry services in Scotland and noted;   
 
The Scottish Government has never produced a separate 
ferry strategy document. However, the National Transport 
Strategy (Scottish Executive 2006) does briefly mention 
lifeline ferry services, stating: “Once the tendering of the 
Clyde and Hebrides ferry service has been completed in 
2007 we will undertake a comprehensive review of lifeline 
ferry services to develop a long-term strategy for lifeline 
services to 2025. The review will include a detailed appraisal 
of routes to determine whether a better configuration could 
be developed in response to calls for new and faster 
connections serving these isolated communities and a review 
of fares structures as part of a broader review of the 
affordability of public transport”
2
. 
 
That Terms of Reference of that Review have recently been 
announced and we deal with it later in this paper.   
 
We shall use the term “Executive Branch” to refer to those 
Scottish Office / Scottish Executive / Scottish Government 
officials and ministers who have held responsibilities 
individually and collectively for formulating and implementing 
ferry policy here down the years. Similarly, we shall use the 
generic term “Transport Committee” to refer to the Scottish 
Parliament’s committee with responsibility for ferry services, 
the name and remit of the relevant transport committee has 
changed over all three sessions of the new parliament.     
 
2.  Scottish Parliament Session 1: May 1999 - 
May 2003 
Before the new (or reconstituted) Scottish Parliament was a 
year old, the Executive Branch published “Delivering Lifeline 
Ferry Services, Meeting European Union Requirements: a 
Consultation Paper”
3
 in April 2000. Reading it now in the light 
of subsequent developments in terms of EC policy and law 
here (and the Executive Branch’s interpretation of that policy 
and law), it actually provides a clear and succinct view of the 
economic and legal issues facing policy makers in the 
context of what they could reasonably be expected to know 
and advise at the time in terms of policy options.  The 
consultation paper announced with respect to a possible 
legislative agenda;   
           
The existing legislation under which subsidies are 
provided to Caledonian MacBrayne … predates the 
UK's accession to the European Union and may 
require some amendment. Ministers take the view 
that any new legislation can be prepared to a longer 
timescale as domestic legislation does not preclude 
the Executive complying with the State aids rules. 
Nevertheless, Ministers believe there could be 
advantage in reviewing the legislation in the longer 
term. Whilst it would not, in any case, be possible to 
have new provisions in place for the first tender 
exercise, for subsequent exercises new legislation 
might be introduced to set the framework for:  
 
 the requirement to tender services in respect 
of PSOs;  
 powers to grant exclusive rights to routes in 
certain circumstances (to rule out "cherry-
picking" in the peak tourist season in a way 
which might undermine the overall viability of 
a route); and  
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
Pages 46-58 
 setting out appropriate roles in respect of a 
possible Highlands and Islands authority, 
local authorities and others.
4
  
 
Before considering the fuller implications of this agenda, it is 
important to clarify the respective roles and potential 
contribution of PSOs (public service obligations) and PSCs 
(public service contracts) under EC law in this process 
especially since contingent issues assume even greater 
significance in later years.  The relevant EC laws and 
guidelines here are contained in a variety of forms; 
regulations, cases and communications of various kinds, and 
I have collected extracts from some seminal or indicative 
documents in a single collation
5
, each of whose extracts 
deals with some or other aspect of PSOs in this context. 
Three points merit emphasis.   
 
First, the respective roles of PSOs and PSCs in this context 
were set out in the EC’s 1992 Maritime Cabotage 
Regulation
5
 which made clear that a PSC could be 
concluded “in order to provide the public with adequate 
transport services” specifying such issues as “continuity, 
regularity, capacity and quality”.   On the other hand, a PSO 
was defined as “obligations which the Community shipowner 
in question, if he were considering his own commercial 
interest, would not assume or would not assume to the same 
extent or under the same conditions”. PSOs were “limited to 
requirements concerning ports to be served, regularity, 
continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to 
be charged and manning of the vessel”. The Commission 
recognised that it would not constitute State aid if the 
shipowner was awarded appropriate compensation (subsidy) 
for carrying out such PSOs, providing any compensation for 
PSOs “must be available to all Community shipowners”.  
 
In short, much like a knife and fork, both PSCs and PSOs are 
alternative tools or instruments designed for different 
economic and legal purposes. If you want to maintain an 
adequate and reliable service, you use a PSC.  If you want to 
compensate (subsidise) an operator or operators for carrying 
out socially desirable (though commercially unprofitable) 
services, you use a PSO. 
 
Second, there may be cases (in some circumstances, the 
norm) where a government would wish to ensure that 
services were both reliably provided and compensated 
appropriately with subsidy. This was acknowledged by the 
European Court in 2001 in the Analir case which recognised 
that that: “even after public service obligations have been 
imposed on the shipowners … complementary services 
could be provided by concluding a public service contract.
7
  
In short, you could use these two tools separately and for 
different purposes, or you could use them together in 
complementary fashion to pursue a particular task – again, 
much as a knife and fork can be used independently of each 
other, or in complementary fashion to eat a meal. 
 
Third, are defined public service obligations required in order 
to subsidise EC ferry services and ensure compliance with 
the Martime Cabotage Regulation and EC state aid law?  
This was the question asked by an MEP of the Commission 
in 2006 and the answer was unequivocal: “These obligations 
may be imposed by regulation or, if this does not suffice to 
meet essential transport needs in an adequate manner, laid 
down by way of public service contracts. If necessary, 
financial compensation may be granted to operators to cover 
the costs involved in meeting public service obligations. The 
imposition of public service obligations is therefore a 
precondition for any compensation being given”.
8 
 
In short, while there are various methods by which PSOs can 
be imposed (including concurrently and in complementary 
fashion with PSCs as the Analir case above implied), the 
imposition of clearly defined PSOs is a precondition for any 
compensation if such subsidy is not to run the danger of 
being treated as illegal State aid.  
 
That PSOs are diferent instruments for PSCs; that you can 
use PSCs and PSOs separately or together; and that you 
must have a clearly defined PSO if you wish to subsidise 
ferry operations under Maritime Cabotage and State aid law; 
all these were (and are) well-established and accepted 
principles following from EC law.  Not only are they law, from 
an economics perspective, they are also common sense; a 
PSC can be a complex and detailed instrument and if you do 
not clearly and separately define what is the PSO (even if it 
is being delivered with the help of a PSC) then it can be 
difficult to isolate and disentangle the part of the contract that 
is being (legitimately) subsidised from that part which could 
be a purely commerial activity. None of this would have been 
regarded as a matter of controversy in the first Session of the 
Scottish Parliament, but as we shall see it has become very 
much a major issue in recent years.  
 
Returning to the legislative agenda sketched out above in 
“Delivering Lifeline Ferry Services”, it could be said to have 
been both appropriate and proportionate.  It included 
provision for PSOs embodied in legislation; measures to deal 
with cherry picking and the issue of exclusivity; and 
consideration of the possible roles that an “authority” could 
take here, this opening up the possibility of provision for 
oversight by an independent Regulator as was common 
practice in other industries providing essential services and 
subject to competitive tendering.
9
 
 
The problem was that none of this ever happened. The 
Consultation Paper said that all this should be deferred until 
after the first tender exercise, which was very much a matter 
of putting the cart before the horse. If the rules of the game 
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are not drawn up until after the game is played, then it is not 
surprising if players and referees are confused about what 
does and does not constitute a legitimate strategy. The 
reason given for the deferment in the first place was timing.  
The Executive stated they were “aiming to have the first 
tender in place by Spring 2001 with implementation to 
follow”
10
, in short, in about a year from the public 
announcement of the intention to consult the public on the 
matter. However, as I argued in 2001 in two submissions to 
the first Parliamentary Inquiry
11
, even then such timing was 
hopelessly optimistic. But this deferment did have the effect 
of helping pre-empt serious debate on what the statutory and 
policy frameworks could and should look like here.    
 
It must be noted that the Executive Branch could reasonably 
claim genuine achievements in this context over this period. 
First, it argued and sustained the case for maintenance of 
the bundling of routes as represented by the CalMac network 
through to the first tendering of these routes (though it should 
be noted that the Commission has raised questions in its 
current investigation as to whether the Executive Branch’s 
actual bundling of routes here has led to potential State aid 
issues
12
). Second, the original 1992 Maritime Cabotage 
Regulation
13
 made no provision for estuary or peninsular 
services to be compensated for (subsidised) under EC law; 
pressure from the Executive Branch and Professor Neil 
McCormick MEP led to the Commission recognising in new 
guidelines
14
 in 2003 that estuary/peninsular services that 
fulfilled certain geographical criteria could be treated as 
islands for such purposes. Third, it arranged for CalMac’s 
vessel and shore-based infrastructure to be allocated to a 
VesCo or an asset owning company, later to be named 
Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd (CMAL), with actual ferry 
operations to be carried out through competitive tendering of 
routes under 5-year (later 6-year) contracts.  Since the 
relevant legislation made provision for possible subsidy of 
route operations through PSOs but not subsidy of investment 
in vessel construction, such separation made it easier to ring 
fence subsidy to operations only, and, as importantly, made it 
easier in principle to demonstrate to the European 
Commission that such ring fencing had taken place.       
 
However, a consequence of the absence of a clear statutory 
framework for the new regime which was to be put in place 
was that the problem was not properly defined and 
structured. It was seen narrowly as one of contract writing 
and adaptation of an existing transport service to comply with 
(what were to the Executive Branch) new EC rules.  The 
problem should have been clearly defined in the first instance 
as one of the introduction of competitive tendering for a de-
nationalised industry providing essential services. Had the 
problem been properly defined, then policymakers could 
have drawn on the considerable body of knowledge and 
experience of how to deal with such problems in other 
formerly nationalised UK industries that also provided 
essential services.  If that had been done then, as I strongly 
argued in evidence
15
 in 2001 to the first Parliamentary Inquiry 
into the tendering of CalMac, policy makers would see from 
previous cases that what was needed was: (a) an 
independent regulator (b) a clearly defined Operator of Last 
Resort (OLR) and (c) a well developed supporting statutory 
framework.  
 
Had the problem been properly defined, policy makers would 
have been more likely to have anticipated and dealt with 
issues contingent on what would have to be radically 
transformed roles and functions of economic actors and 
policy makers in such circumstances. For example, when the 
need for this process became public in 2000, the “CalMac” 
Clyde and Hebridean ferry services were run by a 
nationalised industry which could buy and sell its own 
vessels and had a planning horizon that in principle could 
encompass the life of these vessels, 20 years or more. 
Today, the “CalMac” Clyde and Hebridean ferry services are 
run by an operating company that owns none of the vessels 
or linkspans it uses and whose planning horizon (and 
existence) is limited by a public sector contract which is 
constrained to 6 years under EC law. One side effect of the 
ad hoc manner in which the subsequent process was been 
handled was confusion over who is and who should be 
responsible for the long term strategy formulating role and 
functions that were previously the responsibility of CalMac in 
its capacity as a nationalised industry.  
 
But perhaps the most serious set of errors to flow from the 
misspecification of the problem was that it gave a false 
impression of what competences and capabilities were 
necessary to deal with it.  As long as this was regarded as 
just another transport problem, the Executive Branch could 
be regarded as having an abundance of inhouse resources 
that could be allocated to deal with it. But specifying the 
problem properly makes it clear that, in the UK, the 
competences and capabilities to deal with the introduction of 
competitive tendering for a de-nationalised industry providing 
essential services (such as gas, electricity, 
telecommunications, rail), lay not in Scotland but in the UK 
regulatory agencies and Whitehall. The Executive Branch, 
certainly those responsible for transport, could not in all 
fairness be regarded, then or now, as having significant 
direct experience of these matters.   
 
Part of the reasons for the misspecification of the problem 
may well have been political. There had been attempts to 
privatise CalMac during the term of the Thatcher government 
which had encountered fierce public opposition. Even though 
the Minister responsible told the Scottish Parliament in 
November 2000 that  “I am happy to assure members that 
we have no plans to privatise CalMac”
16 
 the introduction of 
the EC competitive tendering dimension was seen by some 
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as an attempt to “privatise CalMac by the back door”
17
 and 
led to considerable debate inside and outside of Parliament.      
 
It was true that CalMac was not to be privatised, though its 
status as nationalised company was to be revoked and it was 
eventually broken up into constituent State-owned parts. In 
October 2006, ownership of the CalMac’s vessel and harbour 
assets was separated out from the associated ferry 
operations and the operations were transferred to a new 
operating company within the David MacBrayne Group, 
CalMac Ferries Ltd. A separate State-owned company, 
Cowal Ferries Ltd, took over responsibility for CalMac’s 
Gourock-Dunoon operations. Caledonian MacBrayne Ltd. 
retained ownership of these vessel and harbour assets and 
was renamed Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd. (CMAL). In 
July 2006, operation of the Northern Isles ferry services had 
been transferred to NorthLink Ferries Ltd. from the 
predecessor operator.  The David MacBrayne Group became 
the State-owned holding company for the operators CalMac 
Ferries Ltd, Cowal Ferries Ltd, Northlink Ferries Ltd, and 
Rathlin Ferries Ld (the latter in Northern Ireland).
18
 
 
Given that the introduction of competitive tendering and de-
nationalisation for industries providing essential services in 
the UK had typically been through outright privatisation, any 
attempts to apply direct comparisons, capabilities and 
experience from these previous exercises to the CalMac 
case could have run the danger of providing ammunition to 
those who suspected and claimed that the exercise had a 
hidden agenda, irrespective of whether or not that was the 
case.    
 
Whether or not ultra-sensitivity on the part of the Executive 
Branch to charges of “back-doors privatization” contributed to 
the failure of the Executive Branch to properly specify the 
problem, the reality was that officials in the Executive Branch 
handled a major policy problem area with which there was no 
reason to believe they could have direct experience and 
familiarity, and with little evidence of learning lessons that 
could have been drawn from obvious and available 
comparators from UK regulated sectors.   
 
One area where this self-imposed myopia had an almost 
immediate effect was with respect to the apparently arcane 
(but absolutely crucial) issue of Operator of Last Resort 
(OLR). Essential services subject to competitive tendering in 
regulated sectors such as in the UK generally stipulate there 
should be a pre-designated and qualified operator ready to 
take over a tender immediately in the event of an 
incumbent’s failure (whether for technical, financial or any 
other reasons). This is not something that is really needed in 
the case of nationalised industries (as CalMac was at the 
start of this exercise). Nor is it a matter which tends to greatly 
exercise the European Commission.  This is a provision 
where principles of subsidiarity tend to come into play with it 
generally left as a matter for national governments or their 
devolved authorities to deal with. 
 
Nor is the question of OLR something that tends to be raised 
on a day to day basis for anyone looking at current issues 
affecting regulated sectors. It is rarely called on, which to a 
large extent is part of the intention behind it. An analogy can 
be drawn with the rule in tennis that a fault is called if a 
player “deliberately touches (the ball) with the racket more 
than once”.
19
  Once you have the rule, there is little chance of 
it being called on.  But if you do not have the rule then you 
would have a very different game indeed.   OLR is a safety 
net for the case of unexpected technical or financial failure 
which may befall even a well-intentioned operator.  However, 
it is also a guard against moral hazard and the dangers of a 
tenderer using a weak or loose contract to misrepresent their 
true intentions or situation, and renegotiate in the course of 
the contract in the knowledge that the contract awarding 
authorities have little alternative but to accept their new terms 
for continued provision of an essential service.  
Ironically, the issue of OLR need not have become a major 
issue had the Executive Branch adopted a proposal they set 
out in their original Consultation Paper in 2000 to split 
CalMac into a small number of route bundles and tender the 
bundles separately from each other.
20
 Had this been done, 
the Executive Branch could have considered the option of 
inserting a clause into each tender that required winning 
tenders to act as OLR for another tender, if called upon to do 
so, with provision made for appropriate compensation to be 
made in such circumstances. There was no reason in 
principle why OLR responsibilities could not encompass both 
CalMac and Northern Isles operations.  Solutions of this 
nature had been well tried and tested for competitive 
tendering regimes in other industries providing essential 
services. But once it was decided to tender CalMac 
operations as a single bundle, this option was effectively 
precluded. With the self-imposed myopia that arose from 
failing to clearly define the problem as discussed above, not 
only was there failure to appreciate the opportunity for OLR 
solutions when they arose, it led to unintended 
consequences being overlooked when the parameters of the 
problem was changed.  
 
We emphasise that does not mean that CalMac operations 
should have been broken up (indeed as we were to argue 
later in 2005, the Altmark case suggested that there was 
perhaps no need to tender its operations in the first place). 
As was argued at the time, there are network benefits from 
maintaining its route operations in a concentrated bundle. 
But what was a serious issue then and now was how failure 
to recognize such issues and bring them directly and openly 
on to the policy agenda created potentially adverse 
consequences.        
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The potential significance of the OLR issue is illustrated with 
the case of the Commission announcement
21
 in May 2008 of 
their intention to investigate CalMac and Northlink subsidies.  
The announcement notes that in the summer of 2003, a few 
months after starting operations, NorthLink informed the 
Scottish Executive that it could no longer realistically deliver 
its contractual obligations over the four years remaining of 
the contract period
22
. The Scottish Executive concluded 
Northlink was heading for insolvency and unless additional 
subsidy was paid, lifeline services could have been 
interrupted
23
  Significant additional subsidy of about £43mill 
was duly paid
24 
and retendering eventually took place. The 
Commission Announcement
25
 here notes that “According to 
the UK authorities, in preparing its bids, NorthLink assumed 
that it would also enjoy a monopoly on the ro-ro traffic … 
This assumption proved however incorrect”.  It could be 
added that the UK authorities also assumed at the initial 
tender award stage that Northlink would not threaten to 
withdraw from the route unless they were provided with more 
subsidy. That assumption also proved incorrect. The 
Commission’s provisional conclusion which the current 
Inquiry is investigating is that as far as the emergency 
additional subsidies paid to Northlink are concerned, “the 
payments in question likely constitute State aid”
26 
Some points are worth emphasising regarding this series of 
events.   
 
First, despite the fact that there had been many tenders and 
franchises in the UK transport sector over many years, what 
happened in the Northlink case was remarkable and unusual 
and indeed forced retendering of transport operations
27
 has 
been a relatively rare event.  
 
Second, there should have been no basis for excusing 
Northlink’s “incorrect” assumption that it “would…enjoy a 
monopoly”.  As noted above, the Delivering Lifeline Ferry 
Services consultation paper in 2000 noted that one of the 
areas that should be looked at in future was “powers to grant 
exclusive rights to routes in certain circumstances”.  Had that 
been done, and the conclusions spelled out (whether to 
award, or not award, exclusive rights), then it would have 
removed any confusion or ambiguity regarding monopoly 
rights. If exclusivity was not to be granted, then the tenderer 
would bear the commercial risks that might accrue from any 
market entry in the course of the tender. On the other hand, if 
exclusivity was to be granted, then it would be the 
responsibility of the Executive Branch to ensure that the 
legitimate interests of the tenderer did not suffer from 
illegitimate market entry. It was failure to properly specify 
property rights over market operation that helped contribute 
to the subsequent problems in contract execution.                
 
Third, having properly established rights, risks and 
responsibilities in this case, if the operator could be seen as 
being unable or unwilling to deliver on promised performance 
for reasons which were seen as its responsibility, then in the 
final reckoning the Executive Branch should have been in a 
position to trigger the OLR option and replace the tenderer 
(as happened in the case in the Connex rail franchise in the 
South of England in the same year, 2003).
28
   
 
Fourth, we see no reason why similar circumstances could 
not re-occur with the resulting collapse of all or part of a 
tender since there has been no meaningful substantive 
changes in these respects to the regulatory framework that 
still underlies such tenders in the Scottish context.    
 
Fifth, and crucially, even though (as we have noted) the 
question of whether or not to have a clearly defined OLR was 
not something that tended to automatically raise issues of EC 
law and attract the interest of the European Commission, 
failure to deal adequately with the OLR issue directly limited 
the options available to the Executive Branch when the first 
Northlink tender threatened default.  In turn, regulatory failure 
here (and the Hobson’s Choice of a subsidy-fuelled bail-out 
by the Executive Branch) led to possible State aid failures 
under EC law. In other words, it was not sufficient for the 
Executive Branch to make every effort to be complying with 
the letter and spirit of EC law in this context, its failure from 
the beginning to deal adequately with the routine 
administrative nuts and bolts contingent on the introduction 
of competitive tendering into a denationalized industry 
providing essential services had knock-on implications for its 
potential ability to comply with EC law.  
 
Along with Professor Tony Prosser and Captain Sandy 
Ferguson, I had warned in evidence
29
 to the Scottish 
Parliament’s first Inquiry into ferries in 2001 about the 
potential regulatory failings and omissions in the context of 
the proposed tenders, particularly with respect to the 
absence of an independent Regulator and clearly defined 
OLR. In their Report
30
 to the Committee, the committee’s 
reporters noted my specific warning that “the (Northern Isles) 
contract is not yet operational, so the regime has yet to be 
proven effective in practice”.
31
  In the second Inquiry into 
Scottish ferry services in 2005, an MSP asked the Minister 
who was giving evidence to the committee: “Do you accept 
that the evidence that Neil Kay gave to the Transport and the 
Environment Committee back in 2001 about the tendering 
exercise for the northern isles (Northlink) contract has—
unfortunately—proved relevant, given the disastrous collapse 
of that tender?” The Minister replied that there were “lessons 
to learn” from that exercise, but did not expand on what he 
thought they were.
32 
 
All this is without prejudice to the question of whether or not 
the additional payments to Northlink constituted illegal State 
aid, which is a separate matter for the Commission and 
possibly the courts to decide. Our concern here is not with 
these subsequent payments as such, but solely with the 
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events which led up to them, and the point is that had the 
Executive Branch followed proper and well-established 
regulatory systems and procedures, there should have been 
no significant risk here of being hostage to the misfortunes 
that subsequently befell them (and the public interest) in the 
Northlink case. Nor is there to the best of our knowledge any 
suggestion or evidence that Northlink was indulging in moral 
hazard here, and we are not suggesting that was a factor. 
The point is that vulnerability to such behaviour remains a 
structural flaw which can infect all such contracts given the 
weakness of the current regulatory regime.    
 
I had noted in evidence to the Scottish Parliament in 2001, “If 
the public interest is subsequently damaged because issues 
such as regulatory control and SOLR (Operator of Last 
Resort) have been neglected, this will be the Executive’s 
responsibility, not the EU’s”.
33
 The Northlink case may be 
taken as an early example of the consequences of such 
neglect.  The Commission investigation may consider here 
from a legal perspective what the Executive Branch actually 
did (in terms of additional unplanned subsidy payments), 
whereas from a regulatory economics perspective the source 
of these problems is actually to be found earlier in what the 
Executive Branch did not do.   
 
I provided a fuller analysis
34
 of the OLR issue as an appendix 
to my submission to the second Transport Committee Inquiry 
into ferry services in 2005 with an update
35
 in 2006.  Despite 
the lessons that should have been learned from the Northlink 
fiasco, the Executive Branch has not acknowledged, at least 
in public, that this continues to be an unresolved issue with 
serious public interest concerns  
 
As for the question of an independent Regulator, in 2003, the 
Commission advised that for ferry tenders; “In principle, an 
independent authority should be responsible for the whole 
procedure. However, the Commission recognises that, in 
some cases, it might be sufficient for only the final part of the 
procedure (evaluation of the bids and adoption of the final 
decision) to be entrusted to an independent body.”
36
  
 
Whether we describe the agency responsible as an 
independent Regulator, an independent authority, or an 
independent body, the Commission’s view on how this 
process should be governed is consistent with the arguments 
put forward by Professor Prosser and me to Transport 
Committee
37
 and the Executive Branch in 2001.  In ignoring 
or rejecting these arguments, the Executive not only rejected 
what was recognised good practice for essential services 
subject to competitive tendering, it should have been clear to 
the Executive Branch (by 2003 at the latest) that they were 
also rejecting what the European Commission regarded as 
an important minimal requirement for compliance with EC 
law here.  I once again made the arguments for an 
Independent Regulator in 2005 to the second Transport 
Committee Inquiry into ferries, the Executive Branch once 
again noted my arguments, and once again they failed to act 
on them.
38
  In July 2006, I wrote
39
 to the Minister drawing 
attention inter alia to the Commission instructions that an 
“independent authority/body” should be appointed to deal 
with the ferry tendering process but did not receive a 
satisfactory reply.     
 
3.  Scottish Parliament Sessions 2 and 3: May 
2003 – Present Day  
The second Session of the Scottish Parliament May 2003 to 
May 2007 was characterized by the re-formation of an 
Executive Branch coalition of Labour and Liberal Democrats. 
The most visible sign of change in terms of governance was 
that responsibility for ferry services had been in the hands of 
Labour ministers during the first session, and this now 
switched to Liberal Democratic responsibility for the whole of 
the second session. It is not known whether this had any 
direct or indirect impact on government policy.  The election 
of an SNP government in May 2007 created an even more 
visible change in governance, though as we shall see its 
approach to EC law largely reflected changes that had taken 
place in the second Session; however, there were some 
substantive policy changes such as the introduction of a pilot 
Road Equivalent Tariff (RET) Scheme which we discuss 
briefly below.  
However, soon after the start of the second Session, there 
was a major development in the interpretation of EC law as it 
pertained to such services. On 24 July 2003, the European 
Court of Justice in the Altmark case
40
 ruled that providing 
compensation is no more than is necessary to carry out 
clearly defined, transparently and objectively established 
public service obligations to enterprises entrusted with these 
obligations, such compensation did not constitute State aid.
41
  
 
Some of this built on established EU case law, but one 
aspect which did add new elements to the public debate was 
that the European Court now appeared to make provision for 
choice of operator of a PSO service not necessarily having to 
be chosen by open tender.  The European Court had noted 
that where the undertaking was not chosen in a public 
procurement procedure, the level of compensation should be 
determined by a comparison with an analysis of the costs 
that a typical transport undertaking would incur (taking into 
account the receipts and a reasonable profit from discharging 
the obligations). 
 
There has been considerable debate over the meaning, 
relevance and significance of the Altmark judgment, much of 
which goes beyond the scope of this paper.  For the 
purposes of the live debate over policy that existed at the 
time, what Altmark appeared to offer was the possibility of 
alternatives to competitive tendering, a process which had 
been criticised from a variety of perspectives ranging from 
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the potential expense of such an exercise to alleged 
backdoors privatization.    
 
It was in this context that the Scottish Parliament’s Transport 
Committee set up a second inquiry into the proposed 
tendering of CalMac and invited two other academics 
(Jeannette Findlay of Glasgow University and Paul Bennett 
of Edinburgh University) and me to give written and oral 
evidence on the issues.  The then Minister gave assurances 
in evidence to Transport Committee that we would be 
consulted on these issues;   
 
If they are willing, we will make contact with (Findlay, 
Bennett and Kay) who obviously have worked so 
hard on these complicated issues over the past 
weeks and months. We will try to get clarification 
from them where that is important.
42
  
 
That never happened. Instead, on 12
th
 September 2005, just 
two days before the scheduled debate in the Scottish 
Parliament on the proposed tendering of CalMac, the 
Executive Branch published a series of documents on the 
issues, including what could only be described as, in part, 
systematic attempts to discredit the evidence by Bennett, 
Findlay and me.
43
  There was no warning that this was to be 
done, no opportunity to discuss or rebut what were in many 
cases misleading or incomplete statements and criticism of 
these works. The debate in Parliament
44
 took place on the 
14
th
 September 2005 and the point was made strongly in the 
debate that our evidence had not been treated fairly and we 
had not been given the (promised) opportunity to speak for 
ourselves and refute misunderstandings or 
misrepresentations.  To make matters worse, the debate 
added further serious misrepresentation with arguments that 
my proposal would lead to route-by-route tendering, a totally 
spurious allegation without foundation which I had refuted in 
direct evidence to the Scottish Executive own Consultation 
on the issue some months earlier.
45
                 
 
I have no hesitation is stating that Parliament was misled in 
that debate (which decided to agree to the Executive 
Branch’s proposal to tender CalMac). Why that should have 
taken place, and who was responsible, is best left for others 
to judge. One of the most seriously misleading issues was 
when the Executive Branch started its analysis of “Professor 
Kay's 5 part proposal which he suggests would meet the 4 
Altmark criteria” with the bald statement that “the Altmark 
criteria are not applicable to ferry services which fall within 
the scope of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation”.
46 
 
That was what Parliament was told in September 2005. 
Since then the European Commission has made it 
abundantly clear that not only were the Altmark criteria 
“applicable” to such ferry services, adherence to the Altmark 
criteria is essential if such services are not to run the danger 
of being vulnerable to charges of illegal State aid.
47
 But of all 
the statements by the Commission the most serious is the 
announcement
48
 in 2008 of the intention to investigate the 
possibility of illegal subsidies to CalMac and Northlink by the 
Executive Branch. Indeed, much of the announcement is 
largely reducible to two inter-related issues; the apparent 
failure of the Executive Branch to apply the Altmark criteria to 
these ferry services, and the linked issue of their apparent 
failure to apply clearly defined public service obligations to 
ferry services which were to be compensated with public 
subsidy.  As the Commission had clearly warned in 2006;  
 
The imposition of public service obligations is 
therefore a precondition for any compensation (for 
EC ferry services) being given …Such compensation 
does not constitute State aid if it complies with the 
criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in its 
judgment in Altmark.
49
     
 
In short, in rejecting the relevance of Altmark and attempting 
to discredit the academic proposals based around Altmark, 
not only was the Executive Branch case against alternatives 
to tendering CalMac based on totally false premises, even 
worse any proposals they actually implemented ran the 
danger of falling foul of EC State aid law. If you do not 
understand what the rules are, then it obviously increases 
the chances of breaching them, even if inadvertently and in 
good faith. Ignorance is no excuse under the law, especially 
when the law has been set out clearly and consistently, and 
you still choose to ignore it.     
 
These points hold forcibly in the case of the issue of the role 
of public service obligations (PSOs) in EC ferry services.  
The new Session May 2003 – May 2007 had coincided with 
a significant switch in policy with respect to PSOs, though 
one which was not to become publicly apparent for several 
months. Right up until the dissolution of the Scottish 
Parliament at the end of the first Session in May 2003, the 
Executive Branch had made consistently clear the need for 
clearly defined and justified PSOs for subsidized ferry 
services under their jurisdiction.  The last reference I can 
trace to any stated intention by the Executive Branch to 
award PSOs for any ferry service was a News Release
50
, 
20
th
 March 2003. The following week, Parliament was 
dissolved.   
 
Such references by the Executive Branch ceased once the 
new Session of the parliament was underway, but much as in 
the Sherlock Holmes case
51
 of the dog that did not bark, the 
lack of references to PSOs only became apparent when 
sometime later attention was drawn to them. Following 
questions in the Scottish Parliament, the Executive Branch 
stated in 13
th
 June 2006:  
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The Executive is tendering on the basis of Public 
Services Contracts (PSCs). The Executive considers 
that a single PSC for the Gourock-Dunoon ferry 
service and another single PSC for the rest of the 
network offer the certainty and security of a set 
service specification that will be welcomed by Cowal 
residents, residents served by the rest of the network 
and all other users of the ferry services. Public 
Service Obligations (PSOs) would not provide that 
certainty and security of service nor deliver on the 
Executive’s key policy objectives. Consequently 
there is no need to consider, nor do we intend to 
consider, issues arising in relation to PSOs.
50 
                
Two years later (June 2008) during the third Session of the 
Scottish Parliament), the Executive Branch stated in 
evidence to the Transport Committee of the Scottish 
Parliament
53
;  
 
“Creating a formal public service obligation in relation 
to ferries can be done by Westminster but not by us.  
Of course, a PSO merely protects the route's 
infrastructure; it in no way provides for there actually 
being a ferry service, because of the different 
definition of PSO in the maritime world compared 
with the aviation world …a PSC enables us to specify 
all the things that we could do with a PSO” 
 
It has to be said that the position of the Executive Branch in 
repudiating the use of PSOs in this context is bizarre, and 
from the point of view of what is publicly known at this stage, 
inexplicable.    
 
First, the statement that the Executive Branch cannot award 
PSOs contradicts what the Executive Branch had stated in 
2006; “The Scottish Executive also has powers to designate 
particular routes as Public Service Obligations (PSO)” and 
“the Scottish Executive retains control of the planning system 
and PSO designation which both affect ports, harbours and 
ferry routes”
54
.   
 
Second, on the question of a PSO supposedly protecting the 
route’s infrastructure and not services, Olivier Chassagne, an 
official with EC’s Transport Direcorate noted (consistent with 
the 1992 Martime Cabotage Regulation) that; “for maritime 
transport, PSOs can contain requirements only in relation to 
the ‘ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, 
capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and 
manning of the vessel’ (p. 410).
55
  Clearly, PSOs here are 
about operational matters and services, not infrastructure. 
When the Executive Branch stated later in the same 
evidence, “in the maritime context, PSOs are about 
infrastructure; unlike in aviation, they are not about the 
provision of services”
56
, they were plainly wrong. 
 
Third, as for the supposed different definitions of PSO in 
maritime and aviation worlds cited by the Executive Branch, 
Chassagne notes; “In all transport modes, the concept of 
PSOs is quasi-identical”(p.408).
57
  
 
Fourth, on the question of a PSC supposedly enabling the 
Executive Branch to specify all the things that they could do 
with a PSO, Chassagne notes that the 2004 Combus 
judgement of the European Court of First Instance clearly 
states; “contractual obligations under a public service 
contract do not constitute PSOs”(414)
58 
 
But that is just the beginning of the problems.  As we noted 
earlier, extant EC law both in principle and in actual case law 
makes it absolutely clear that if you do not have clearly 
defined and justified PSOs, then any compensation (subsidy) 
for ferry services may be judged illegal State aid.  This is not 
an abstruse point, this is what concerned the Executive 
Branch in the first Session of Parliament 1999-2003. But, 
most bizarrely of all, if the Executive Branch was in now in 
any doubt about the need to apply clearly defined and 
justified PSOs if you want to subsidise ferry services, all they 
had to do was to consult the Commission announcement
59
 of 
the decision to investigate the possibility of illegal State aid 
by the Executive Branch to CalMac and Northlink ferry 
services which had been made public some months ago and 
to which the Executive Branch had been invited to respond. 
Right at the beginning of this document, the fourth paragraph 
of the Summary reads:  
 
With respect to the grants awarded to CalMac, 
NorthLink 1 and NorthLink 2 the Commission 
questions whether these grants correspond to 
properly defined public service obligations within the 
meaning of EC law, and has doubts as to whether 
the related compensation is compatible with the 
common market.
60 
       
The rest of the document is largely concerned with noting 
cases where the Executive Branch may have failed to 
properly define public service obligations (and adherence to 
the Altmark criteria) and possible implications under State aid 
law. 
 
How the Executive Branch could still now deny that properly 
defined public service obligations (and the Altmark criteria) 
were not only relevant but essential for ensuring that 
subsidised ferry services do not run the danger of falling foul 
of EC law here, is simply difficult to comprehend.  Even if, 
despite the Executive Branch’s statements in this matter, the 
Commission subsequently takes a view (contrary to that of 
the Executive Branch) that clearly defined PSOs can indeed 
be somehow identified within the PSCs in question, why take 
the unnecessary risk that the Commission will not take such 
a view?  I made these points consistently and forcibly since I 
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first became aware of the problem, including in a letter to the 
Minister
31
 in July 2006, but none of this appears to have had 
any discernable effect.       
 
In short, it appears that the Executive Branch’s evidence on 
what they understood by EC law in this context was not only 
wrong on a number of counts, it was so badly wrong as to 
represent a complete misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation of what had been known for a number of 
years to be accepted EC law here, posing real problems and 
dangers for the public interest.  
 
It should be emphasised that this is without prejudice to 
whatever the Commission might decide in their current 
investigation into alleged illegal subsidies to Scottish ferry 
services. The Commission may indeed take a sympathetic 
line to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of EC law here, 
the point is the Executive Branch’s approach to these 
problems has exposed the public interest here to completely 
unnecessary risks on these grounds, as well as failing to 
provide a coherent foundation for the formulation of past, 
present, and future policy in this context.  
 
Finally, we note in passing that in August 2007 the Executive 
Branch announced details
62 
of a Road Equivalent Tariff 
(RET) pilot scheme for setting ferry fares in Scotland. RET 
involves setting ferry fares on one measure of the 
comparative cost of travelling an equivalent distance by road. 
The pilot scheme started on 19 October 2008 with RET 
applied to several routes in the Western Isles. The pilot was 
scheduled to run for 2½ years from October 19 2008 to 
Spring 2011.   
 
The Executive Branch argued that the high cost of ferry fares 
have been seen by many as a barrier to economic growth on 
the islands and on this point there is widespread agreement.  
I had previously conducted a review
63
 in 2001 of CalMac 
fares policy and concluded there was an economic case for a 
significant fares decrease across the board. That still leaves 
the question of whether the RET approach can be justified on 
economic and social grounds, whether in principle and/or in 
practice.   
 
Reviewing RET goes beyond the scope of the present 
analysis, from the point of view of its place here it is sufficient 
to note that when the European Commission was asked by 
an MEP regarding its attitude to RET, the Commissioner 
replied that even if RET was used as a basis for pricing and 
subsidising ferry services, EU law on maritime cabotage and 
State aid would still apply.
64
  
 
Beyond RET, the fundamental problem here is to fathom a 
coherent way forward when the Executive Branch appears to 
know less now about the proper regulatory and legal basis 
for the formulation and implementation of ferry policy than 
was expressed in “Delivering Lifeline Ferry Services” in 2000.    
 
4.  Conclusions 
It is difficult to overstate both the scale of the failures in policy 
making with respect to Scottish ferries post-devolution, nor 
how unnecessary such failures have been.  The context was 
set in 2000 with what can be seen as little more than a hasty 
response by the newly-formed Scottish Executive to comply 
with EC law here in a matter of months. In principle, the old 
Scottish Office pre-devolution could be criticised for 
apparently having been slow to respond to the policy needs 
here, since the Maritime Cabotage Regulation had been put 
in place in 1992, while relevant EC State aid legislation here 
dated from even earlier periods. The time horizon set out by 
the Executive Branch for compliance (which I pointed out at 
the time was never realistic) was used as a justification for 
shelving any proposals for the kind of statutory framework 
and regulatory oversight that was by now regarded as normal 
practice for protecting the public interest in the provision of 
essential services which were to be subject to competitive 
tendering and EC law. Had the proper steps been taken, 
there would have been no need to start with a blank page. 
Lessons could have been drawn from precedents associated 
with other such industries providing essential services, and a 
coherent statutory framework and derivative rules and 
guidelines would have set out the roles and functions of the 
basic building blocks for such an exercise, such as an 
independent Regulator, Operator of Last Resort (OLR), and 
public service obligations (PSOs). It would also have 
constrained the policy making ad hocery which has 
characterised this area in subsequent years                
 
The most obvious and direct failures in the first Session of 
the Scottish Parliament 1999-2003 were in the context of 
domestic and administrative failures to provide adequate 
regulatory oversight and safeguards. However, as we have 
seen, the regulatory issues of independent Regulator and 
OLR had spillover implications for the Executive Branch in 
terms of potential issues relating to compliance with EC law.  
The dangers here were exacerbated in the periods of the 
second and third Sessions of the Scottish Parliament by the 
Executive Branch’s rejection of PSOs and the Altmark criteria 
in this context – despite the clear and consistent messages 
from the European Commission and the European Court that 
if you want to subsidise Scottish ferry services you have to 
have both clearly defined PSOs, and adhere to the Altmark 
criteria.  
 
We now stand at a position for which I can find no precedent, 
indeed it is difficult to discern logic behind it. We have a 
situation in which commentators (author included) have been 
interpreting and advising what has been accepted good 
practice in terms of regulatory standards, and essential 
practice in terms of EC law, yet on major issues that advice 
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has tended to be consistently rejected by the Executive 
Branch. Even when it has become absolutely clear that the 
European Commission supports these positions on issues 
such as an independent Regulator, PSOs and Altmark, the 
Executive Branch either explicitly rejects or continues to 
ignore such arguments. This is a situation where even when 
a position can be shown to be demonstrably false there 
appears to be no effective way to alter it. It is with that 
mindset that the Executive Branch’s ferry policy has steamed 
full speed ahead into the current European Commission 
investigation into alleged illegal subsidies to Scottish ferry 
services.  
 
The dangers are now both specific (contingent on the current 
Commission investigation) and general (with respect to the 
future of Scottish ferry policy, and the resulting economic and 
social implications). 
 
On the specific dangers contingent on the current 
Commission investigation, by default the Executive Branch 
have effectively ceded much control and discretion over ferry 
policy to third parties in Brussels.  The Commission has 
already made it clear in their announcement
65
 that they see a 
prima facie case that there may have been illegal subsidies 
to CalMac and/or Northlink, for reasons we have discussed 
above. One issue which the Commission has signalled they 
will be looking at is the bundling of CalMac routes
66
 raising 
once again the possibility that the Executive Branch may be 
forced to break up the network into separate smaller tenders 
– not for economic or social reasons but because the 
Commission wish to force through one version of increased 
transparency, an issue which the Executive Branch has 
demonstrably failed to deliver to date. Ironically, this 
tendency to break up of the network may be reinforced by 
the failure of the Executive Branch to put in place safeguards 
against cherry picking (cream skimming or market 
skimming), even though the Commission provided clear 
guidelines
67
 in 2003 on how this could be done under EC 
law.  These omissions had given the moral and legal high 
ground to potential cherry pickers who had been publicly 
pressing for the break up of the CalMac network to allow 
them to target high value / low cost market segments. 
Unconstrained market entry through cherry picking remains a 
potential threat to the sustainability of ferry tenders in this 
context, whether or not routes are to be bundled.  
 
Another issue which is likely to arise
68
 in the current 
Commission investigation is the questions of subsidy to the 
Gourock-Dunoon CalMac public service when there is an 
unsubsidised private service close by. There are solutions to 
this situation consistent with EC law as I have argued
69
 but 
since the Executive Branch has repudiated the use of PSOs, 
it is difficult to see how they can make any coherent 
representations on this matter to the Commission.  
 
But more generally, the failures by the Executive Branch 
here are likely to prejudice and distort any attempts at 
developing workable policies in this context. In August 2008, 
the Executive Branch announced a Review of ferry policy;      
 
The review will include how lifeline ferry services 
should be procured. It will consider among other 
things; appropriate legislation and regulations, the 
use of PSOs and PSCs, how the routes should be 
bundled together, the need for a tendering system in 
future and flexibility in contracts.
70
  
 
But how could such a Review set out to credibly discuss role 
of PSOs when, as we have seen, the Executive Branch in 
evidence to Transport Committee only two months earlier 
had once again completely dismissed any notion that they 
would use PSOs in this context – together with the totally 
misleading inference that anything a PSO could do, a public 
service contract (PSC) could do as well? As for discussion of 
“how the routes should be bundled together, the need for a 
tendering system in future and flexibility in contracts” there is 
absolutely no point in discussing strategies and tactics when, 
as we have noted, you clearly do not understand the rules of 
the game.  The potential scale of public and private 
involvement in this Review is substantial, but given the 
premises on which it is built, it also promises to be a 
considerable waste of these resources and a focus for false 
expectations   
 
One point that should be noted in passing is that it has been 
argued that a reason why the Executive Branch has resisted 
PSOs (in regional air services as well as ferry services) is 
possibly lack of co-operation and support (or even active 
resistance) from Whitehall. While the Executive Branch has 
devolved authority here, the UK is still the recognised 
national authority from the perspective of Brussels.  If 
Whitehall was concerned that awarding PSOs for Scottish 
regional air and ferry services could trigger a wave of “me-
too” lobbying for PSO-supported subsidies from other 
regional transport services south of the border, then they 
might be reluctant to support such mechanisms.  
 
There is not enough information in the public domain at this 
point to judge and evaluate the role of UK authorities, if any, 
in this context. What can be said is that even if the attitude of 
the UK authorities could be construed as actively unhelpful, 
this does not explain the extent and persistence of the 
failures on the part of the Executive Branch that we have 
documented here.             
 
If there is a common theme running through the problems we 
have discussed here, it is that we have seen that, if faced 
with a choice between recognising and accepting 
incontrovertible facts and evidence versus sticking to 
discredited past decisions and policies, the Executive 
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Branch’s default option is for the latter. If the responsible 
departments we were dealing with were private or 
commercial organisations, such failings would usually not be 
tolerated for long and would normally be fairly easily exposed 
and dealt with. However, government departments raise 
more complex issues of adaptability, responsibility and 
accountability.  
 
Before any solutions can be developed here it must be 
clearly understood where the problems lie. It is ultimately a 
question of competences and capabilities, or, more precisely, 
the lack of them. The first step is to define the problem as not 
just another transport issue but as one of one of regulatory 
issues for an industry providing essential services under EC 
law.  Once that is done, then it opens up real possibilities for 
drawing on lessons, precedents, guidelines and statutory 
frameworks developed for other essential services.    
 
One part of a coherent path forward would be the 
appointment of a Task Force composed of qualified experts 
in the regulation of industries providing essential services, 
and in EC Competition and State aid law, to advise how 
policy options should be framed and pursued here. I argued 
for this in 2005 and it was supported in Parliament by the 
main opposition party the SNP
71
, but it has not been pursued 
since it formed the new government in May 2007. 
 
The second part of a coherent path forward would be, having 
now defined the problem properly, to appoint and give 
responsibility here to full time administrators and officials 
here with backgrounds, experience and qualifications in the 
administration and regulation of industries providing essential 
services under EC law.  This is not to denigrate the 
competences and capabilities of the officials who have been 
responsible for developing and administrating Scottish ferry 
policy to date. However, the fact of the matter is that they 
could not be expected to possess the necessary experience 
and skills required here since virtually all previous work 
relevant to the introduction of competitive tendering and de-
nationalisation for industries providing essential services had 
taken place at UK and not Scottish level. Unlike most of the 
other formerly nationalised UK industries, State owned ferry 
services were essentially a Scottish phenomenon; indeed 
their relative unimportance at UK level and political 
sensitivities at Scottish level were almost certainly 
contributory reasons as to why it had been left effectively 
untouched by the wave of de-nationalisations and 
privatisations of the Eighties and Nineties started by the 
Thatcher government.  But what it also meant was that the 
repositories of expertise that existed on how to deal with 
these problems were mostly to be found south of the border.           
 
There should have been, and should be, no shame in looking 
beyond the Scottish border for the appropriate competences 
and capabilities; indeed anyone who recognises the merits of 
cross border trade knows it can take place in intellectual and 
administrative human capital as well as other goods and 
services.  Historically, there have been many areas of 
Scottish competences and capabilities where the cross 
border trade in human capital has emphasised exporting, so 
importing necessary competence and capabilities here 
should not have been controversial or problematic. Had the 
problem been defined properly to begin with, this part of the 
solution would automatically have suggested itself. However, 
given the default tendency of the administrative apparatus for 
old solutions and procedures despite being discredited, even 
sensible and logical suggestions are inclined to look 
hopelessly unrealistic and unattainable in such contexts.  
While that might not seem an optimistic conclusion, it might 
be regarded as not unreasonable given that this unresolved 
and muddled policy debate has already run almost the full 
course of the reconstituted Scottish Parliament’s first decade.  
The answers you get depend on how you frame the 
questions, and until the Executive Branch properly frames 
policy questions here along the lines advocated in this paper, 
there are major obstacles in the way of obtaining a coherent 
policy framework that pursues social and economic 
objectives while still being sustainable and defensible under 
EC law.     
 
__________________ 
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